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The Nuclear Condition in the 21st Century: techno-political aspects in historical 
and contemporary perspectives Editorial 
 
Richard Beardsworth/Hartmut Behr/Timothy Luke 
 
I) Background and the framing of the debate 
This Special Issue is composed of seven closely interlinked papers and one editorial 
introduction. All papers emanate from two workshops under the aegis of a UK 
Leverhulme grant on the convergence of Classical Realism and Critical Theory.1 The 
workshops were held at Virginia Tech in June 2015 and Aberystwyth University in 
January 2016. The papers were subsequently presented at a panel at ISA, Atlanta, 
March 2016. The Special Issue is the second that comes out of this research grant’s 
activities, with the first being more theoretical, putting in dialogue Classical Realist 
and Critical Theory texts. The interlocution of these two bodies of thought has its 
common focus in the observation that their advocates hold much more in common 
than is usually assumed in the discipline of International Relations (henceforth IR). 
Indeed, in orthodox accounts both are regarded as opposites, and more often than not 
Critical Theorists are used to attack the ostensible tenets of Classical Realism. In sum, 
the papers in the Special Issue “Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: 
Negotiating ‘Divides’ in International Relations Theory” (2017) showed the 
theoretical benefit of reading Classical Realism from the perspectives of critical 
theorising: which consists mainly in freeing Classical Realism from the grip of 
positivist IR, in overcoming the juxtaposition of “isms” in the discipline, and, in 
advancing disciplinary debates regarding analysis of Western modernity, crises and 
existential questions of humanity. Accordingly, as the first Special Issue aimed to 
show, the framing of IR and international politics in “isms” is not only historically 
false and misleading; it is intellectually constraining. 
 One such existential question is the theme of this second Special Issue: the 
nuclear condition in the twenty-first century.  Putting Classical Realists and Critical 
                                                          
1 We capitalize these terms throughout so as to identify them as two distinct bodies of thought 
or traditions within, respectively, International Relations and the social sciences and 
humanities more widely. 
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Theorists into dialogue is here analytically promising from a less theoretical, more 
practical viewpoint: genuine discussions based on existential fears can be offered 
rather than discussions framed through the constraints of opposing bodies of thought. 
Advocates of Critical Theory and of Classical Realism experienced the emergence of 
atomic energy and their use for military purposes first hand in the late 1940s and 
shared their observations, criticism, and concerns about (the survival of) the human 
species. Thus, the major focus of the research in the first Special Issue—the focus on 
modernity, crises, and humanity—is taken up here practically. Bringing both bodies 
of thought to bear on each other has a liberating effect, in other words, not only for 
our historical understanding of Classical Realist and Critical Theory texts, but also for 
our own analytical focus beyond orthodox framings of the nuclear condition. 
 Not long after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, proponents of Classical Realism and 
Critical Theory addressed the implications of nuclear arms for international politics 
and the human condition in general. After V-J Day, the conditionalities of unipolar 
nuclear military and civil politics constituted a state of exception, which was shocking 
in the Soviet bloc and comforting in the Western bloc, until the USSR quickly gained 
its own nuclear capabilities. Many thinkers—ranging from Hans J. Morgenthau to 
Herbert Marcuse—put forward important ideas about the strategic, political, moral, 
and existential implications of weaponized nuclear energy in the ensuing years. 2 
Morgenthau and Marcuse were of course not the only ones to respond to the nuclear 
revolution, but they were undoubtedly the most prominent. We briefly use them here 
to frame the debates in this Issue.  
As Morgenthau gauged world politics after 1945, he stressed how the novelty 
of nuclear weaponry remained too entangled with traditional military and diplomatic 
theories and practices from a by-gone era. “There exists,” as a result, “a gap between 
what we think about our social, political, and philosophic problems and the objective 
conditions which the nuclear age has created” (Morgenthau, 1964: 23). Conversely, 
Marcuse recognized in the extraordinary strategic stability begotten by the paradox of 
nuclear force severe intra-national consequences. Containment and deterrence 
represented a hollow “peace maintained by the constant threat of war,” which 
“extended to a whole system of domination and coordination,” and strangely unified 
                                                          
2  In this Special Issue see Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest’s paper on Gunther Anders 
as well as the discussion of Albert Einstein by Jan Ruzicka.  
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“forms of life (and of power) which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the 
system” (Marcuse, 1964: xliv). In this regard, Marcuse, as Rens van Munster and 
Casper Sylvest observe elsewhere (2016a; 2016b), carefully rethinks how the nuclear 
condition is much more than a geopolitical construct, but pervades the everyday 
existential experience of human beings as such.  
For both these major political theorists, it was clear that “the nuclear age … 
ushered in a novel period of history” (Morgenthau, 1964: 23). That said, Marcuse’s 
careful mapping of strategic nuclear deterrence gave greater texture to the novel 
characteristics of static containment politics. He asks and observes for example: 
Does not the threat of an atomic catastrophe that could wipe out the human race also 
serve to protect the very forces that perpetuate this danger? The efforts to prevent 
such a catastrophe overshadow the search for its potential causes in contemporary 
industrial society.  These causes remain unidentified, unexposed, unattacked by the 
public because they recede before the all too obvious threat from without—to the 
West from the East, to the East from the West. Equally obvious is the need for being 
prepared, for living on the brink, for facing the challenge.  We submit to the peaceful 
production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated 
for a defense which deforms the defenders and that which they defend (Marcuse, 
1964: xli). 
 
We can begin to merge the two traditions of Classic Realism and Critical Theory here. 
Two decades after World War II they deduced the logics of nuclear deterrence and 
strategic containment and concluded therefrom a paradoxical, contradictory dynamic 
of nuclear armament by taking the dictum “si vis pacem, para bellem” (see Vegetius 
Renatus, De Re Militari) thermonuclear. 
Seven decades after the two iconic wartime atomic bombings of Japan, and 
five decades after Morgenthau’s and Marcuse’s uneasy appraisals of the novel 
qualities of the nuclear condition from 1945 to 1965, can one remain content today 
with frustrated assessments of the nuclearized global governance that Morgenthau and 
Marcuse believed was rising from the nuclear condition (as it developed during the 
darkest days of the Cold War)? Returning to the paradox of nuclear force that 
Morgenthau first identified, one must ask how novel this moment from the modernity 
of the twentieth century is and why so many people still try to live out their “thoughts 
and act through [their] institutions” from an age that is long gone (Morgenthau, 1964: 
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23). Further, Marcuse argues that an effective critical theory of society must confront 
“the problem of historical objectivity” (1964: xlii), and yet too few have willingly 
engaged in this historical confrontation regarding the nuclear. 
 Following the parameters of the debate on the nuclear conditions--illustrated 
clearly by Morgenthau and Marcuse as consisting of new techno-political challenges 
to national and global governance as well as to the human condition and to political 
imagination more generally--we can now make concrete the objectives of the Issue 
and show how they will be dealt with by its individual contributions. 
 
(II) Objectives of the Special Issue  
Empirical observations  
The papers collected in this Special Issue consider the contemporary nuclear 
condition from within the theoretical frameworks provided by Classical Realism and 
Critical Theory. All papers either engage this condition from a historical perspective, 
inquiring in depth into authors from each tradition who witnessed and discussed the 
emergence of the nuclear condition at the end of World War II, or employ Critical 
Theory and/or Classical Realism for their own argument. Since these frameworks 
emphasize the importance of historical change, the engagement with both traditions 
also allows contributors to diagnose what is new (or not) about the contemporary 
nuclear condition in comparison with the conditions of 1948 and 1989. The result is a 
closely interlinked set of papers that examine, in multiple ways and with both 
common and different conclusions, reflective, critical responses to contemporary civil 
and military nuclear politics (see also Schmid’s use of the term ‘nuclearities’ in this 
Special Issue). Indeed, the conjuncture of new geopolitical constellations and techno-
political challenges presents an opportunity to ask to what extent we understand the 
plural and diverse conditions of nuclear politics and its weaponization today. The 
most important phenomena of such geopolitical constellations and gaps that the 
papers collected here discuss are:  
 new non-state, state, corporate, and non-governmental organizations that will 
be, or actually are, developing very different understandings of how nuclear 
weapons should be designed, manufactured, operated, or used as the mutually 
assured destruction regime (or the Cold War) recedes in history;  
 the loss of legacy of nuclear systems from the Cold War as well as their 
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decreasing credibility, reliability, or functionality;  
 new systemic approaches to weaponizing nuclear materials by non-state 
militias, transnational firms, scientific networks, superpower militaries, or 
terrorists for a plausible variety of new operational applications; 
 new weapon technologies that could render Cold War-era delivery systems 
less effective or reliable to the point of undermining a logic of mutually 
assured destruction in a possible nuclear confrontation;  
 new supranational actors that might make "zero-option" nuclear governance 
agreements a viable institutional possibility;  
 the advent of new transnational threats—climate change, resource scarcity, 
global pandemics, etc.—that prompt shifts towards both more global 
government and, conversely, the possibility of tactical nuclear warfare. 
 
It is clear that 2016 is no longer 1946 or 1989. On the one hand, during the Cold 
War, the Peoples Republic of China, Israel and India weaponized nuclear energy. 
Likewise, Brazil, South Africa, and Argentina turned down the same road but 
stopped when high costs, failed governments or geopolitical realities made the 
journey too arduous to continue. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine willingly 
locked down and then scrapped Soviet systems left in their territory after 1991. 
On another hand, in the nuclear conditionalities after 1991, Pakistan pushed to build 
a bomb, and North Korea pulled together resources and expertise from several hidden 
locations to assemble its own nuclear capabilities, even though both states were under 
constant scrutiny and pressure by the thermonuclear union of card-carrying nuclear 
states to cease the military development of nuclear energy. Today’s actually existing 
nuclear condition suggests that new nuclearities are evolving technopolitically.  
 Specific political consequences follow from this nuclear condition that 
redound to the question of whether and how the nuclear is governable. We need to 
talk, accordingly, of a distinct techno-political constellation as the challenge and 
objective of social and political governance and radical political imagination (from 
the late 1940s to today and beyond). The import of such imagination is radical 
because it needs to reach beyond the legacies of our thinking – mainly that of the 
nation state. The existential dimension of the nuclear remains unprecedented; it 
therefore requires new rhetorical frameworks that might better meet the challenges 
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posed by politics experienced in existential terms. As an existential threat, climate 
change presents something comparable in this regard. Morgenthau’s arguments as to 
the necessity of a world state and of obsoleteness of the nation state in the face of the 
nuclear threat—an argument that resonates with John Herz’s concerning the 
obsoleteness of the nation state’s “hard shell”—is thus one version of both the techno-
political nature and the consequence of the nuclear condition. At the same time it is a 
theme of Critical Theory par excellence: the technological achievements of modernity 
are illusory; they do not liberate humanity, indeed their rationalities enslave humanity 
and humanity’s path towards freedom – a formal promise of modernity that is 
shattered by modernity’s concrete face, as argued in Dialectic of Enlightenment (and 
again in Marcuse’s analysis in One-dimensional Man). 
The unbroken faith of the successor states to the Cold War in the apocalyptic 
novelty of the nuclear bomb is, however, still anchored in conventional 
technopolitics, embedded, in turn, in their on-going deterrence rituals. Yet, are 
today’s actually existing nuclear assemblages more chaotic and complex? Pathetic 
rusting missile silos in the Great Plains and Central Asia are another marker of tragic 
narratives of power morphing into dramatic strategies for great power politics no 
longer beholden to superpower hegemony. Those concerns, however, are so vast that 
no one set of analyses can address them. Consequently, this Special Issue will 
foreground only a few examples in order to probe the major tensions and problematics 
of today’s nuclear condition in its shifting nuclearity. It appears clear that, as the 
technopolitical order distributed between things and people, systems and sites, and 
hazards and threats evolves, nuclearity in 2017 is no longer fixated upon the inter-
operating impasses of mutually assured destruction.  
 
Conceptual consequences 
Nuclearity then is to be seen not as an essential attribute of radioactive rocks, metals 
or elements, but rather as a techno-political quality that is created, discursively and 
practically, and then “distributed among things” (Hecht, 2012: 14). It also entails new 
meanings, purposes or uses from the Iraq war, Israel’s nuclearization, North Korea, 
Iranian science, Fukushima Daiichi, Syrian subterfuges, power dynamics on the 
Indian subcontinent, and the emerging geopolitics of the possibility of nuclear 
terrorism. Hecht is correct: “How places, objects or hazards get designated as 
‘nuclear’ has often been contentious,” and thereby “designating something as nuclear 
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-- whether in technoscientific, political or medical terms -- carries high stakes” 
(Hecht, 2012: 8). The common conceptual core of all papers is, accordingly, 
rehearsed through four foci:  
i) the materiality of the nuclear condition and its political implications and 
challenges; 
ii) this condition’s existential dimension and attempts to create nuclear 
normalcy; 
iii) techno-political responses to nuclear materiality and the question of 
nuclear governance (world government, deterrence, and arms control); 
iv) the need for comprehensive political imagination with regard to the 
nuclear condition as a whole: this need for comprehensive imagination 
always includes the possibility that the nuclear condition is, however, 
ungovernable.  
The techno-political materiality of the nuclear condition in the 21st century hence 
evinces governance challenges with regard to questions of world government, arms 
control, and deterrence—challenges that put into question the governability of the 
nuclear condition and raise the question of whether its materiality results in a life of 
its own that withdraws from political governance. If this thought were correct, then 
the theoretically charted nightmare of Critical Theorists concerning the inhumane 
consequences of modern technology--not humanity’s advance but a regression—
would have become a melodramatic reality. The nuclear condition would be left to 
technocratic expertise, to inherent necessities, to practical constraints and to radical 
immanence (see the paper by Daniel Levine in this SI)—a total depoliticization that 
calls into question the very possibility of politics in the nuclear age (unless political 
imagination becomes radical). Here, the lack of meaningful progress on nuclear 
disarmament and abolition since the invention of nuclear arms is telling since there 
has been no shortage of attempts to achieve this abolition since their invention 
following WWII. 
 In addition, we have evidence not only of the fragility of nuclear machines and 
devices, but also of how fragile and artificial the assumed boundary between 
“peaceful” and “military” purposes is. And yet, each new “nuclear deal” affirms and 
re-affirms this supposed boundary, as the community of scholars and policy-makers 
who push for nuclear security and the special circumstances of the techno-political 
(including the self-destructive capacity of nuclearity embedded in a disenchanted 
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modernity), and as multinational power companies and the nuclear industry 
“normalize” the nuclear condition and its challenges. In scholarship and among 
policy-makers, however, the unique dangers raised by the possibility of nuclear 
warfare have created an intense debate about what political action is needed to avoid 
it. Whilst most scholars contend that it is possible to prevent a nuclear war without 
massive political change, others argue that a substantial solution to the problem 
demands the abolition of the existing interstate system. Irrespective of how one would 
negotiate the question of change or continuity in international governance structures, 
so long as nuclear weapons remain in someone’s possession, the nuclear condition 
cannot be argued away. It continues to be humanity’s condition.  
 The first two papers by Sonja Schmidt and Columba Peoples analyse in detail 
the material conditions and discourses of such conditions as they underpin the 
military and civil uses of nuclear energy. Both papers suggest that only a more 
holistic techno-political approach to the nuclear condition in the 21st century can deal 
with present nuclear realities (non-state actors as potential possessors of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear material; nuclear terrorism; the role of nuclear energy in climate 
change strategies; nuclear waste; and visions and strategies of delimited nuclear 
warfare). 
The next two papers by Daniel Levine and Casper Sylvest/Rens van Munster 
consider, amidst critical reflection on of all four foci, the problem of political 
language and action under the nuclear condition in an age of consumerism and 
devitalized political agency (as they argue). On the assumption that the nuclear 
condition poses existential threats to humankind, they both call for radical (in the 
sense of fundamental and comprehensive) approaches to rethink language and action 
that capture such a condition. 
The final three papers focus specifically on governance aspects of the 
technopolitical with regard to the exceptionalism of nuclear weaponry. Campbell 
Craig and Dan Deudney analyse the dilemmas of Classical Realism’s responses to the 
thermonuclear revolution and suggest, in disagreement with each other, different 
political architectures to deal with it today. Jan Ruzicka addresses the recent attempt 
to revitalize the nuclear non-proliferation / disarmament regime through a 
humanitarian approach, concluding that it provides another (failed) attempt to deal in 
moral and legal terms with what is an essentially historico-political problem.  
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